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ABSTRACT 
This paper urges greater recognition of the case study as a research method for 
management. It acknowledges concern about the representativeness of case studies 
but by specifying the relationship between epistemology and research methods shows 
that this concern is misplaced. Representativeness is irrelevant for many research 
purposes, particularly when the distinction is made between logical and statistical 
inference. The validity of explanations or theory derived from case studies depends 
on the logic of the analysis and acknowledgement of ceteris paribus conditions, not 
on how typical the cases may be. 
Typologies of case studies have been proposed and these are considered, together 
with recommendations for the conduct of systematic and rigorous case study research. 
It is stressed that research problems should be addressed using appropriate research 
methods. Research of the important problems within the management area 
frequently demands a qualitative research approach, though it would seem that such 
an approach is often ignored because of a positivist research orientation. 
An assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the case study method, which 
highlights its potential in the vital role of theory-building, leads to the conclusion 
that this method has much to commend it to management researchers. 
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In Recognition of the Case Study 
Why should the research of management academics have intellectual authority and 
command the respect and attention of practitioners ? An appropriate response to such 
a question would note the role of management academics as social scientists and that 
management research is therefore ‘scientific’. It is not simply because management 
academics are usually to be found in universities and other ‘centres of learning’ and 
often have titles conveying eminence and wisdom. t The legitimacy of management 
research must also be derived from the way in which it is conducted. In other 
words, the scientific method is employed to ensure that research findings are 
meaningful, both theoretically and practically too within an applied discipline, 
accepting that they may not have immediate application. 
Einstein said ‘the whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday 
thinking’. The refinement comes from the methods which scientists employ. So it is 
the use of the scientific method which confers legitimacy on management research 
(and, as a consequence, much management teaching). However, what does the 
scientific method amount to in application to management? An examination of the 
content of many management journals containing empirical papers would suggest that 
being scientific means quantification within a hypothetico-deductive approach to 
science. Qualitative and inductive approaches are much less frequently reported, if 
at all (1). 
Consideration of the contribution of this management research (the extent to which it 
is meaningful) is beyond the scope of this paper. It would raise a number of major 
questions, particularly about the agenda for management research and who sets it; 
though these issues should not be ignored (2). The concern here, however, is with 
whether in seeking to apply scientific method to management, researchers are using 
the most appropriate research methods and techniques. This clearly has some bearing 
on the potential contribution of research in management. The case study, it is 
suggested, is deserving of greater recognition as a research method. Such a claim has 
to be made within the context of an appreciation of what management research is 
trying to achieve. 
Within social science generally there has long been criticism of positivist research 
orientations (3). This is gradually being acknowledged within the management 
literature (4). However, positivism continues to dominate, especially in the United 
States. Despite the leadership of the United States in management education, the 
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scientific is not solely or necessarily the result of number-crunching. While this 
author would not deny a role for quantitative approaches within management 
research, qualitative approaches, including the use of the case study method, are 
often more appropriate for tackling the important research problems of management. 
In using any research method it is helpful to understand its epistemological 
underpinnings. By examining the relationship between epistemology and research 
methods further support can be found for the use of qualitative approaches, such as 
the case study, in management research. It should be noted that all references to 
case study research in this paper refer to the development of case studies for research 
purposes. Teaching cases are developed to illustrate established theory. Research 
cases are used to build theory, though this does not preclude their later development 
into teaching cases. 
Epistemology and Research Methods 
‘Although business researchers may need to learn even more about 
techniques, their notable weakness is their inadequate emphasis on the 
research process. Knowing how to use the tools and techniques of 
research does not in itself guarantee the effectiveness of an individual 
in carrying out a scientific investigation’ (5). 
Rigby’s observation on the failure of management researchers to address fundamental 
methodological concerns seems almost as valid today as it was twenty years ago. 
Such a criticism is borne out by the reference above to the positivist orientations 
found in much published management research. Positivism can be simply defined as 
‘working as natural scientists are believed to’ (6). It reflects, therefore, a belief that 
the social sciences can be investigated in the same way as the natural sciences. Many 
writers on research methodology have argued against positivism, the essence only of 
these arguments will be necessary here to demonstrate the relationship between 
epistemology and research methods and, as a consequence, the shortcomings of some 
of the more commonly adopted research approaches in management. 
It should first be noted that positivists only rarely define themselves as such. 
Positivism is all but a term of abuse; though some would say rightly so, for in 
extreme cases it amounts to an ignorance of epistemological issues. Yet the waters 
beyond positivism are dangerous. They are best avoided by the faint of heart. In 
some respects, to operate within a positivist framework allows the researcher the 
luxurv nf nnt havinp tn nnmtinn whethpt the rmearrh k mtwninafmml* the 
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methodological concern of such research often focuses on internal rather than 
external validity. Ultimately this is dysfunctional if social science is to advance. 
There has been considerable debate about the ‘scientificness’ of the social sciences, 
including management (7). Science aims to create order, to make sense of facts. It 
seeks patterns or regularities. In so doing, a process of systematic observation, 
description, explanation and prediction is employed. At least this much can be 
agreed on. And all of this may be found within the social sciences. A reasonable 
position to adopt seems to be one of admitting the limitations to social science 
achievements while acknowledging the complexities of social science research. It 
may then be claimed that the social sciences are sciences insofar as they apply 
scientific method. But one must ask what form of scientific method (if any) is 
appropriate to social science. 
Consider the nature of this particular human activity known as science. Hughes 
notes that ‘scientific methods seek deliberately to annihilate the individual scientist’s 
standpoints and are designed as rules whereby agreement on specific versions of the 
world can be reached: a distinction, in short, between the producer of a statement 
and the procedure whereby it is produced’ (8). The outcome of these methods is 
scientific knowledge: ‘a systematic body of concepts, theories, principles and laws or 
law-like statements designed to explain phenomena’ (9). This outcome is achieved 
where plausibility is recognised or where, as Hughes puts it, there is agreement on 
specific versions of the world. The problem for the social sciences (and hence some 
of the complexity of social science research as acknowledged above) is that this 
involves a human attempt to explain human phenomena. This is problematic because 
it is doubtful as to whether method, can ever ‘annihilate’ the individual scientist’s 
standpoint. Medawar admits this problem within the natural sciences, he quotes 
Whewell: ‘Facts cannot be observed as facts except in virtue of the conceptions which 
the observer himself unconsciously supplies’ (10). Such is the dilemma posed for the 
social sciences, that Hughes feels obliged to ask: ‘is a science of social life 
impossible?’ (11). 
In reference to Schutz, Hughes explains the dilemma of the social sciences in terms 
of the social construction of reality: ‘like all sciences they make objective meaning 
claims, or at least aspire to do so, but in the case of social sciences these have to be 
within the context of the human activity which has created them and which cannot 
be understood apart from this scheme of action’ (12). As Berger and Kellner put it, 
in a different context, ‘direct access to facts and laws... is never possible, no matter 
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interpretation* (13). This is the basic epistemological problem of social science. How 
can the human world be objectively known in subjective, human terms? 
One may, indeed, go further, for scientific activity and what is associated with it, 
including the status of scientists and scientific knowledge is, after all, like the 
phenomena studied by social scientists, a social construction. As Ford neatly 
observes, ‘when academics take off their white scientific coats and funny 
philosophical hats they turn into ordinary people’ (14). This is the problem, and one 
that social scientists cannot escape. Moreover, to echo an earlier and vital theme, if 
they didn’t have their white scientific coats and other accoutrements of scientific 
activity - including titles and ivory towers - would the outcome of such activity, 
scientific knowledge, still have intellectual authority? For, as Hughes observes, ‘it is 
necessary to ask what it is about the procedures and methods used by sociological 
researchers or economists, psychologists, historians, etc, which makes them superior, 
gives them greater intellectual authority than those used by, say, the man or woman 
in the street, the journalist, the racial bigot, the politician, the revolutionary, or a 
Trobriand Islander’. 
Clearly, at this juncture, the analysis of epistemological issues surrounding social 
science research has reached a point well within the maze of research methodology. 
The problems facing social scientists seems intractable. One might, therefore, take 
heart in the following words from the sociologist George Homans, quoted by Denzin 
in The Research Act: 
‘The most important advice I can give the contemporary sociologist 
has nothing to do with the validity of my arguments. It is this: you 
do not have to believe anything about theory and methodology that is 
told you pretentiously and sanctimoniously by other sociologists - 
including myself. So much guff has gotten mixed with the truth that, 
if you cannot tell which is which, you had better reject it all. It will 
only get in your way. No one will go far wrong theoretically who 
remains in close touch with and seeks to understand a body of 
concrete phenomena’ (15). 
It is very easy to end up in a methodological maze. Providing the researcher has a 
basic grasp of the issues and remains close to the phenomena studied, meaningful 
research is likely to be conducted. Yet, within this sensible conclusion, lies a key to 
some resolution of the problem identified above as well highlighting the principal 
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intellectual authority, stems from whether the scientist qua scientist was able to ‘stand 
back a bit’, achieve some measure of objectivity. Morally at least, there is an 
obligation on the scientist to do this if claims of superiority are to be made. But 
even though social science involves human attempts to investigate human phenomena, 
a natural science, positivist approach to the social sciences often ignores the 
inevitable act of interpretation by the scientist. It then becomes invalid because the 
attempt at objectivity is illusory. Moreover, because of this artificial distancing, the 
researcher is not sufficiently close to the phenomenon under investigation to 
understand it. So, just as there is a requirement ‘to stand back a bit’, there is an 
equal requirement not to stand back so far that the findings are distorted by distance 
as well as by the act of interpretation (16). 
This argument about distance from the phenomenon under study and its impact upon 
objectivity and whether research is meaningful can be expressed another way. It was 
earlier noted that science involves a systematic process of observation, description, 
explanation and prediction. In applying natural science methods and techniques to 
social science problems, positivist approaches assume that social science is at a point 
of development whereby methods and techniques appropriate to explanation and 
prediction may be employed and that much of the complexity of social phenomena 
can be ignored. For much of social science, observation and description, with 
possibly limited explanation, are the requisite modes. Certainly this is true of 
management. Accordingly, methods appropriate to this phase of development need to 
be employed. 
Bonoma, in one of the few papers in the management literature on the case study 
method, covers this problem of positivist research orientations by referring to a 
trade-off between ‘currency’ and ‘data integrity’ (17). Currency pertains to 
generalisability of results, an amalgam of what is elsewhere termed external validity 
and pragmatic or ecological validity. Data integrity refers to those characteristics of 
research that affect error and bias in research results, an amalgam of internal 
validity, statistical conclusion validity and reliability. Bonoma notes that, ideally, 
high levels of both data integrity and results currency should be sought, but that it is 
not possible for any single research method simultaneously to minimise multiple 
threats to both data integrity and currency. So, for example, laboratory experiments 
offer high data integrity but low currency, in contrast to case research which offers 
high currency but low data integrity. He explains: 
‘the study which seeks a high degree of data integrity requires a 
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s a m p l e  s ize a n d  q u a n tita t ive d a ta  fo r  statist ical p o w e r , a n d  th e  abi l i ty .,- h-i l .  ~n * ,‘*~ * 
to  exerc ise  c o n trol ove r  persons ,  sett ings, a n d  o the r  factors to  p reven t 
causa l  c o n ta m i n a tio n . In  c o n trast, a  s tudy wh ich  seeks  h i gh  cur rency  
typical ly d e m a n d s  s i tuat ional ly  u n c o n s t ra ined o p e r a tiona l isa t ions  o f 
var iab les  to  a l low cross-set t ing genera l isa t ion ,  a n d  observa t ions  wi th in  
n a tural ,  eco log ica l ly  va l id  set t ings - “no isy” set t ings - w h e r e  la rge  
samples ,  q u a n tita t ive m e a s u r e s , a n d  c o n trol a re  m o r e  diff icult to  
ach ieve .  O fte n , th e  latter k ind  o f s tudy d e m a n d s  a  g rea te r  u s e  o f 
sub ject ive  or, a t b e s t, c l in ical  analys is .’ 
In  m a k i n g  th e  trade-off ,  choos ing  th e  r ight  m e th o d , B o n o m a  s u g g e s ts th e  researcher  
h a s  to  cons ide r  th e  p u r p o s e  o f th e  research  a n d  n a tu re  o f th e  p h e n o m e n o n  u n d e r  
invest igat ion.  O n  th e  fo rmer ,  B o n o m a , in  essence ,  n o tes  th a t h i gh  d a ta  integr i ty 
m e th o d s  ( and , the re fore,  wi th l ow  cur rency)  c a n n o t b e  e ff iciently app l i ed  to  theory -  
bu i l d ing  research;  th a t is, research  a t th e  descr ip t ion  e n d  o f a  research  c o n tin u u m  o f 
descr ip t ion,  c lassi f icat ion, compar i son ,  m e a s u r e m e n t/est imat ion,  es tab l i sh ing  
assoc iat ion,  a n d  d e te rm in ing  cause  a n d  e ffect. Th is  is b e c a u s e  ‘ei ther  th e  p o w e r  o f 
d e d u c tive m e th o d s  is u n d e r u ti l ised, o r  theo ry  a n d /o r  m e th o d  a re  p r e m a ture ly  p ressed  
into serv ice w h e n  the i r  under l y ing  a s s u m p tio n s  c a n n o t b e  m e t’. O f cou rse  th e  
conve rse  app l ies  to  h i gh  cur rency,  induct ive  m e th o d s . In  cons ide r ing  th e  
p h e n o m e n o n  u n d e r  invest igat ion h e  s u g g e s ts th e  key  issues  a re  w h e the r  th e  
p h e n o m e n o n  c a n  b e  s tud ied  o u ts ide its no rma l  set t ing (of ten requis i te  fo r  h i gh  d a ta  
integr i ty)  a n d  w h e the r  it is a m e n a b l e  to  q u a n tif ication. O n  th e  latter po i n t, B o n o m a  
g ives  th e  e x a m p l e  o f g o o d  pract ice in  ma rke tin g  m a n a g e m e n t as  a  research  top ic  
wh ich  current ly,  a t least,  d e fies  q u a n tif ication. 
. 
In  l ook ing  a t th e  research  c o n d u c te d  in  ma rke tin g , B o n o m a  conc ludes  th a t ‘th e  
a p p a r e n t research  b ias  towa rds  types o f invest igat ion th a t p rese rve  d a ta  integr i ty a t 
th e  e x p e n s e  o f cur rency  resul ts in  a  m e thodo log i ca l  one -s i dedness  th a t m a y  impa i r  
th e  d e v e l o p m e n t a n d  tes t ing o f s o u n d  theo r ies’. Th is  re i terates th e  conce rn  ear l ie r  
exp ressed  a b o u t th e  research  a g e n d a  fo r  m a n a g e m e n t. S o m e  a reas  o f m a n a g e m e n t 
c a n  qu i te  leg i t imate ly  b e  invest igated us ing  q u a n tita t ive a n d  h y p o th e t ico-deduct ive 
a p p r o a c h e s . In  such  c i rcumstances  o n e  m ight  conc lude  th a t pos i t iv ism is accep tab le . 
Howeve r , to  w h a t extent  a re  th e s e  a reas  m o r e  wor thy  o f invest igat ion th a n  th o s e  
d e m a n d i n g  m o r e  induct ive  a n d  qual i ta t ive a p p r o a c h e s ?  O n e  m u s t cer ta in ly  q u e s tio n  
a  research  a g e n d a  shou ld  it b e  d e te r m i n e d  by  a  r equ i r emen t to  u s e  par t icu lar  research  
m e th o d s . 
8 
In sum, an understanding of the epistemological issues surrounding social science 
research point to the requirement to use an appropriate method for the research 
problem; in other words, ‘horses for courses’. The debate about positivism has 
illustrated the limitations of traditional research methods when applied to many social 
science problems. An alternative and seemingly more potentially fruitful path would 
employ qualitative and inductive approaches. The case study is included in such 
approaches. 
Epistemological issues as discussed above seem frequently to be considered irrelevant 
to the practice of research - to be ignored if the researcher can latch on to an 
appropriate research method, appropriateness usually stemming from prior use in 
similar circumstances. Yet they have a direct consequence for the meaning which 
may be attributed to ’ research; meaningful research demands a sound 
epistemological base to the ch methods. Epistemology and research methods are 
interrelated in a complex v Despite the assumed division between the theory and 
practice of research, the iw., ;.. nnci; be considered in isolation. There is, so to speak, 
a two-way street. Much of the criticism of the use of case studies in research stems 
from this misapprehension, the view that the relationship between epistemology and 
research methods is unidirectional, a one-way street. 
In Reply to Questions of Representativeness 
The principal criticism of case studies in research is that they are unrepresentative. 
Theoretical conclusions derived from case studies are not considered to be valid 
unless the cases can be demonstrated to be ‘typical’ of the phenomena under 
investigation. The very word ‘representative’ implies recourse to survey research 
methods to demonstrate, via quantitative procedures, that the theoretical conclusions 
derived from the cases are applicable to the population as a whole. Qualitative 
research, according to the canons of positivism, is fine for exploratory studies, but 
quantification is necessary to establish the validity of any findings. The special issue 
of Administrative Science Quarterly, on qualitative research, contained as a preface a 
neat illustration of this point under the heading ‘The Seminar’: 
Qualitative researcher: ‘Many people these days are bored with 
their work and are....’ 
Quantitative researcher 
(interrupting): 
What people, how many, when do they 
feel this way, when do they work, what 
dn thev do. whv are thev bored. how 
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long have they felt this way, what are 
their needs, when do they feel excited, 
where did they come from, what parts 
of their work bother them most, 
which...’ 
Qualitative researcher: ‘Never mind.’ 
So concerns with representativeness may be irrelevant. Some would argue this 
irrelevance is absolute. Others that it is only temporary, that - for the moment - 
representativeness can be ignored, but that it must be attended to eventually if 
generalisations - valid theoretical conclusions - are to be made. The next section, in 
examining theory-building and the case study method, is largely concerned with the 
former proposition that representativeness is absolutely irrelevant. Such a proposition 
rests on accepting the two-way street concept of the theory and practice of research, 
that there is an interrelationship between epistemology and research methods and 
hence concern with whether cases are typical or not is epistemologically erroneous. 
However, before explaining why this should be so, it is useful to consider the 
proposition that representativeness is only temporarily irrelevant. In so doing, the 
more conventional argument for the use of the case study method may be briefly 
explored. 
Perhaps surprisingly, there is not a great deal of literature on the use of the case 
study method, at least not under that title. Yet many researchers refer to case 
studies. This imbalance seems to reflect the low status of case study research 
(because of the representativeness issue) and the view that it is not a method as such. 
One can find references to research methods such as repertory grid or comparative 
analysis which then produce case studies, but they are not conceived as forming a 
part of case study method. Consequently, McClintock et al refer to case study 
‘strategies’ rather than ‘methods’: ‘The differences between case study and sample 
survey strategies in the analysis of organisations reflect a broader distinction in the 
social sciences between qualitative and quantitative methods’ (18). This would 
indicate that case studies are an approach, rather than a method. As Goode and Hatt 
put it over thirty years ago: 
The case study, then, is not a specific technique. It is a way of 
organising social data so as to preserve the unitary character of the 
social object being studied. Expressed somewhat differently, it is an 
nnnrnach whbh vkwc an\, cnrinl annit am o -=PLAIP A I...,.“, ,.1.......- cl.:- 
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means of approach includes the development of that unit, which may 
be a person, a family or other social group, a set of relationships or 
processes... or even an entire culture (19, their emphasis). 
Clearly the case study is not a technique, it is not a means for obtaining data. Yet it 
may be described as a research method insofar as it is a method for organising data. 
(One may also refer to case study methods (20), such as participant observation, 
content analysis, or repertory grid, by which data for case studies is obtained. 
However, it is simpler to distinguish between techniques and the method, particularly 
as techniques such as content analysis or repertory grid are not exclusive to the case 
study method.) 
Case studies, as qualitative research, may be employed within a positivist perspective. 
One may seek to involve numbers and counting, as Jauch et al suggest in advocating 
the structured content analysis of cases (21). Or, as McClintock et al propose, apply 
the logic and method of survey research (22). The latter paper considers some of the 
literature on the use of case studies and qualitative vs. quantitative approaches. It 
suggests a choice between ‘thick’, ‘deep’, and ‘holistic’, and ‘thin’, ‘narrow’, but 
‘generalisable’. In response to the question: ‘What do you do if you prefer data that 
are real, deep and hard?’ (raised by Zelditch in 1962), McClintock et al favour the 
invention of research designs that incorporate qualitative and quantitative strategies. 
They seek (quoting Warwick), ‘to wed the qualitative and historically attuned case 
study with representative coverage and quantification’. By incorporating elements of 
positivist research design (sampling, quantification, etc.), they absolve themselves 
from the charge that their cases are unrepresentative. 
Theory-building and the Case Study Method 
So the problem of representativeness may become temporarily irrelevant either by 
choosing to view case studies as appropriate to exploratory work only, or by making 
them representative through the application of quantitative procedures. However, 
both solutions still accept the epistemological requirement for representativeness. 
One may, alternatively, view it as absolutely irrelevant. 
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, one may have different intentions when 
using case studies as opposed to survey research. One’s purpose, for example, may 
be with description rather than correlation. Consequently, Benson and Hughes 
distinguish between the different intentions in ethnomethodology and what they 
^L^^^^ c.. c,.-- ,.~r..~s-.+:r\"nl cnf.;nl~n~ lrepA @-mQ;fi"ict). 
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‘What we are not saying is that ‘conventional’ sociology and 
ethnomethodology are in competition with each other; that, for 
example, the ethnomethodologist’s approach to the study of crime is a 
better alternative to those exemplified in criminology or sociology... 
under ethnomethodological treatment the topic as conceived by 
‘conventional’ sociology tends to dissolve or disappear, suggesting, to 
put it no stronger than this, that ethnomethodology’s interest lies in a 
different direction pointing to different phenomena’ (23). 
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, there is the recognition that 
representativeness is irrelevant because it can be a spurious basis for claiming 
validity. Worsley and others write: 
‘The general validity of the analysis does not depend on whether the 
case being analysed is representative of other cases of this kind, but 
rather upon the plausibility of the logic of the analysis. The 
generality is of the same kind that enabled Sir Ronald Ross to 
announce the ‘cause’ of malaria when he found the malaria parasite in 
the salivary gland of a single female Anopheles mosquito in 1897 (24). 
Clyde Mitchell has expanded on this argument in a recent article which presents a 
particularly thorough and convincing submission for the case study method (25). As 
he shows, ‘logical inference is epistemologically quite independent of statistical 
inference’. How he comes to this conclusion is worthy of close consideration. 
Mitchell starts by referring to an eclipse of interest in case studies as a method of 
sociological analysis, which he attributes to the tremendous increase in quantitative 
studies following the development of statistical techniques and powerful computer 
technology. He suggests there is a consequent confusion about the use of case 
studies, as indicated by the challenge frequently addressed to those who have chosen 
to pursue the deviant path of case studies: ‘How do you know the case you have 
chosen is typical?’ Mitchell responds to this challenge by explaining the difference 
between making inferences from statistical data and from cases. In so doing, he 
provides guidelines for the use of case studies in social investigation and theory 
building. 
A simple definition of the case study is at first presented: ‘the basic descriptive 
material an observer has assembled by whatever means available about some 
nnrtirltlar nhennmennn nr cat nf PIILL~+P’ ThL. l.n...a.,n.. . ..#....A ,.,..a r--l.. .^ rL- 
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‘cases’ of physicians and other practitioners trained in the systematic recording of 
information, such as psychiatrists, social workers and so on. It is necessary to 
emphasise the distinction between their purposes and that here of using the material 
to infer theoretical principles. Moreover, the term observer is better replaced by 
analyst because of these analytic intentions. So Mitchell’s definition characterises a 
case study as ‘a detailed examination of an event (or series of related events) which 
the analyst believes exhibits (or exhibit) the operation of some identified general 
theoretical principle’. Different types of case study may be identified according to 
their complexity and their use (these are considered in the next section). Following 
his classification of the types of case studies, Mitchell turns to his central concern 
and the ‘fundamental problem’ in case studies: ‘the basis upon which general 
inferences may be drawn from them’. 
Mitchell asks how ostensibly unique material can form the basis for inference about 
some process in general. The very word ‘case’ connotes this uniqueness and the 
implication of a chance or haphazard occurrence. Yet most social anthropological 
and much sociological theorising is founded on case studies. He suggests the 
difficulties in the practice of the case study method arise out of the common 
assumption that the only valid basis of inference is that which has been developed in 
relation to statistical analysis. However, as Mitchell goes to great lengths to explain, 
statistical analysis merely permits the inference that characteristics within the sample 
may be expected within the population. Theorised relationships between the 
characteristics are the result of a separate procedure and not substantiated by 
statistical analysis. Having described the purposes of statistical analysis, Mitchell 
writes: 
In so far as the descriptive features of the sample (and therefore of 
the parent population) are concerned the validity of the inference is 
probably sound. The distribution of age of a representative sample 
drawn from a parent population probably reflects reasonably 
accurately - given sampling errors - the distribution of ages within 
that population. A difficulty arises however when the relationship 
between characteristics is considered. In the sample analysed a 
relationship - a correlation - in fact may be noted between say age 
and the probability of being married. In terms of the canons of 
statistical inference the analyst may assume that the same relationship 
exists between the same characteristics in the parent population. Note, 
however, that the inference from the sample in relation to the parent 
---m.,-.:^- :” ,:.....1.. "kc...+ tkn nnnhvnit9nt variatinn nf tW0 
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characteristics. The analyst must go beyond the sample and resort to 
theoretical thinking to link those characteristics together... The 
inference about the logical relationship between the two characteristics 
is not based upon the representatives of the sample and therefore upon 
its typicality, but rather upon the plausibility or upon the logicality of 
the nexus between the two characteristics (his emphasis). 
Mitchell offers an interesting example of a study for which the author claimed 
validity on the basis of statistical significance, but which was rejected because it was 
not plausible. The findings were rejected not because the variables failed to 
statistically correlate, but because they were not logically (or causally, if one prefers) 
related. The researcher had linked interpretations of Rorschach ink-blots with 
dietary disorders. It had been found that there was a statistically significant 
difference between those with dietary disorders and those without, in terms of the 
former reacting to the blot with a ‘frog’ response. This the researcher attributed to 
an unconscious belief in the cloaca1 theory of birth, which involves oral impregnation 
and anal parturition. The cloaca of the frog (its excretary and reproductive canals) 
are common, a biological fact providing, it is assumed, the rationale for this belief. 
The researcher hypothesised: ‘Since patients should be inclined to manifest eating 
disorders: compulsive eating in the case of those who wish to get pregnant and 
anorexia in those who do not... such as patients should also be inclined to see cloaca1 
animals such as frogs on the Rorschach.’ The response of other clinical psychologists 
to this however was ‘I don’t believe it’, even after having seen the experimental 
results. The theory proposed was rejected on the grounds of plausibility, regardless 
of unimpeachable method. As Mitchell explains, ‘While the clinical psychologists 
may well have accepted that more people with dietary disorders saw the blots as 
frogs than those without, they could not accept the explanation of the relationship 
between the two characteristics’ (his emphasis). 
He is not, of course, the first to recognise such a distinction. Glaser and Strauss, for 
example, make the distinction between theoretical and statistical sampling: 
‘Theoretical sampling is done in order to discover categories and their 
properties, and to suggest the interrelationship into a theory. 
Statistical sampling is done to obtain accurate evidence on 
distributions of people among categories to be used in descriptions or 
verifications’ (26). 
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Mitchell, in turn, recognises the commonly accepted distinction between statistical 
inference and scientific or causal inference. The former is ‘the process by which the 
analyst draws conclusions about the existence of two or more characteristics in some 
wider population from some sample of that population to which the observer has 
access’; whereas, ‘scientific or causal - or perhaps more appropriately - logical 
inference, is the process by which the analyst draws conclusions about the essential 
linkage between two or more characteristics in terms of some systematic explanatory 
schema - some set of theoretical propositions.’ Importantly though, Mitchell 
recognises that the distinction is often absent in quantitative studies: ‘In analytical 
thinking based on quantitative procedures both types of inference proceed pari passu 
but there has been some tendency to elide logical inferences with the logic of 
statistical inference: that the postulated logical connection among features in a sample 
may be assumed to exist in some parent population simply because the features may 
be inferred to coexist in that population’ (his emphasis). 
More importantly, this distinction paves the way for illustrating the irrelevance of 
representativeness in case studies, for the analyst, in using this method, is only 
concerned with logical inference. As Mitchell argues, ‘the process of inference from 
case studies is only logical or causal and cannot be statistical and extrapolability from 
any one case study to like situations in general is based only on logical inference. 
We infer that the features present in the case study will be related in a wider 
population not because the case is representative but because our analysis is 
unassailable’. So in summary of Mitchell’s position on the extent to which case 
studies have validity, Silverman writes, ‘the claim, therefore, is not to 
representiveness but to faultless logic’ (27). 
Silverman points out that implicit in Mitchell’s analysis here is the logic of analytic 
induction. Mitchell contrasts analytic induction and enumerative induction in 
reference to Znaniecki and to Robinson. Referring to the latter, he observes ‘by its 
procedures analytical induction isolates the necessary circumstances for the 
manifestation of some phenomenon but does not in itself establish sufficient 
conditions... whereas enumerative induction, as exemplified by statistical procedures, 
establishes sufficient conditions for the phenomenon to occur’ (his emphasis); though 
this is not to suggest a case for using both case studies and quantitative procedures, 
that is, as noted above, adopting the position that representativeness is only 
temporarily irrelevant. Robinson’s argument assumes case studies concentrate on 
instances where the phenomenon under investigation actually occurs. To do such is, 
of course, eminently sensible, it is a far more efficient way of seeking evidence than 
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statistical procedures to take into account those occasions when the pheno 
not occur, for these will have already been accounted for in the theorizing. As 
Mitchell puts it, ‘the extent to which generalisation may be made from case studies 
depends upon the adequacy of the underlying theory and the whole corpus of related 
knowledge of which the case is analysed rather than on the particular instance itself. 
Selecting cases for study will, as a consequence, not therefore rest on how typical the 
case may be, but on its explanatory power. Indeed, ‘deviant’ cases may be chosen, as 
analytic induction suggests, to demonstrate the limits to generalisation. The 
presentation of the case will be limited to that material which most effectively 
reveals the theoretical principle investigated, for just as the ‘best’ cases are employed, 
so are the ‘best’ elements within each case. This atypical, selective quality to case 
studies gives rise to their criticism as a basis for generalisation, but this is ill- 
founded. Irrelevant elements, just as irrelevant cases, would merely serve to confuse; 
providing the analyst meets the ceteris paribus criterion they should be ignored. 
Mitchell explains: ‘in interpreting the events in any particular case theoretically the 
analyst must suppress some of the complexity in the events and state the logical 
connexions among some of the features which are germane to the interpretation’. 
And later, in reference to Gluckman, ‘it is perfectly justifiable for the analyst to 
operate with a simplified account of the context within which the case is located 
provided that the impact of the features of that context on the events being 
considered in the analysis are incorporated rigorously into the analysis’. Much, of 
course, is left to the analyst, particularly his or her intimate knowledge of the 
circumstances of the case: 
All cases are necessarily contextualised and generalisations made from 
case studies must therefore be qualified with a ceteris paribus 
condition. It is incumbent on the observer to provide readers with a 
minimal account of the context to enable them to judge for themselves 
the validity of treating other things as equal in that instance.’ 
Mitchell’s observations on the logic of case studies has been usefully summarised in a 
table by Silverman. This is shown in the table below: 
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The Logic of Case Studies 
Claim to 
validity 
Nature of 
explanations 
Relation to 
theory 
Survev Research 
Depends on representative- 
ness of sample 
Correlations not causes 
Theory-neutral 
Case Studies 
Only valid if based 
on articulated 
theory 
Logical/causal 
connections 
Theory-dependent 
In sum, it snould be recognised that epistemology and research methods are 
interrelated. A position on the former does not simply give rise to the latter. 
Accepting this two-way street prompts a reappraisal of the accepted wisdom that the 
case study method is inferior to quantitative methods because it lacks 
representativeness. Such a charge often prompts the response that representativeness 
is temporarily irrelevant; either because the case studies are exploratory, implying 
survey research at some future date, or that quantitative and qualitative procedures 
may be combined to provide the ‘best of both worlds’, which, while acknowledging 
the usefulness of case studies, still assumes the importance of representativeness. 
Alternatively, representativeness may be viewed as absolutely irrelevant. This 
position, contrary to accepted wisdom, reflects either an acknowledged difference in 
purpose, as in the concern of an ethnographer to describe a simple society as part of 
an anthropological study, or recognition of the epistemological distinction between 
statistical inference and logical inference. 
Types of Case Study 
Gluckman distinguishes between three types of case study, which may be viewed as 
falling along a continuum of increasing complexity (28). These are ‘apt illustrations’, 
‘social situations’ and ‘case studies’. 
The apt illustration is ‘a description of some fairly simple event or occurrence in 
which the operation of some general principle is clearly illustrated’. More complex is 
the analysis of a social situation, where ‘some restricted and limited (bounded) set of 
events is analysed so as to reveal the way in which general principles of social 
organisation manifest themselves in some particular specified context’; for example, 
Gluckman’s account of the official opening of a bridge in Zululand, which brought 
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together different sectors of the population, reflects the structure of South African 
society at that time. Then, finally, there is the extended case study, typically dealing 
with a sequence of events over a long time period and ‘where the same actors are 
involved in a series of situations in which their structural positions must continually 
be re-specified and the flow of actors through different social positions specified’. 
The emphasis here is on a process. While apt illustrations and social situations are 
principally distinguished by their differences in complexity, social situations and 
extended case studies are distinguished by complexity and the duration of time 
spanning the events described. The extended case study is probably best exemplified 
by the lone anthropologist landing on a South Seas island, note-book and pencil in 
one hand, a large suitcase in the other, with the intention of staying for some time. 
Margaret Mead’s study of the coming of age in Samoa would be a well-known, if 
highly criticised, example. 
Eckstein has distinguished five categories of case study according to the way in 
which the case may be used as a contribution to theoretical thinking (29): 
1. Configurative-idiographic studies. 
2. Disciplined configurative studies. 
3. Heuristic case studies. 
4. Plausibility probes. 
5. Crucial case studies. 
Crucial case studies are comparable to the crucial test in the natural sciences. 
Plausibility probes are studies designed to tentatively test theory developed - which 
has perhaps resulted from heuristic case studies. Configurative-idiographic studies 
describe events and their circumstances which may indicate relationships, but not 
necessarily general theoretical interpretations. Finally, there are disciplined 
configurative studies, which do indicate general theoretical interpretations. They ‘as 
their name implies are still configurations or patterns of elements but the observer 
does not look upon these as unique or “idiographic”. Instead the analyst seeks to 
interpret the patterns in terms of general theoretical postulates.’ 
Conducting Case Study Research 
The data collected frequently comes from both primary and secondary sources. 
Semi-structured interviews, using interview schedules often provide much of the 
primary data. The interviews should, with the permission of the respondents, be 
taoe-recorded and suhseouantlv tmnwrihd in fIllI Trcxncrr;h;nn ;n+ar.rZn..re :.. n 
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lengthy process, but worthwhile in enabling the researcher to stay close to the data. 
Tape-recording ensures all data were noted and, in leaving the researcher free from 
the burden of making notes, allows concentration on the issues of concern and 
rapport to develop more easily. Data such as copies of letters, reports and so on, 
may also be obtained from intervievvees. 
Interviews are problematic in a number of ways, but principally: 
1. Through the interviewer’s values - reflected in the questions asked and the 
interaction, as well as non-verbal cues (raised eyebrows, for example) - which 
may bias response and interpretation. 
2. In terms of validity - respondents providing answers the interviewer wants to 
hear, or that the respondent would like the interviewer to hear. 
3. Inappropriate for the research question. Some research questions cannot be 
answered by interviews. 
These problems and others as identified by many sources (30), must as far as 
possible, be controlled for; though the author has much sympathy with Silverman’s 
position that there is no bad way of doing interviews, there is only bad analysis of 
interviews. As he writes, ‘for positivists, interviews are essentially about ascertaining 
facts or beliefs out there in the world’, whereas (as an interactionist would argue) 
interviews may also be seen as social events in themselves, involving interviewer and 
interviewee in mutual participant observation (31). Interviews are not just about 
asking questions and taking the answer given, but also about interactions, as, for 
example how they reveal feelings or fears. So finally, before reviewing the strengths 
and weaknesses of case studies, this section should make brief mention of the form 
of analysis which may be employed. 
The more sophisticated sources on qualitative data analysis (32) refer to explicit 
coding and analytic procedures, whereby categories (concepts or relationships) and 
their properties are identified and analysed as they occur within the data. Some 
advocate quantitative procedures, from simply counting categories to statistical 
analysis. Ignoring the positivist overtones of coding and its analysis, there is the 
problem of specifying what to code. If the data alone is to generate theory then 
clearly categories cannot be specified a priori. This suggests either leaving the 
coding to the end of the data collection, which would deny flexibility such that 
;ntmrnctino catemries wnuld onlv be recognised too late to prevent appropriate 
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investigation within the study, or coding everything, a burdensome (if not 
impossible) task, as Glaser and Strauss acknowledge. They propose the constant 
comparative method, which, they suggest, incorporates an ongoing explicit coding 
procedure and permits theory development during the study. 
However, on the basis of this author’s experiences of case study research this source 
and even the ‘hands-on’ manual by Miles and Huberman, seem remote from the 
practice of research. Research as lived, where interviews are a process of continual 
idea development; where theory is the outcome of a combination of studying other 
works, the data collection and chance occurrences and conversations; where as Latour 
and Woolgar comment on the natural sciences, order is brought forth from chaos (33); 
research as lived may not have the time or requirement for such fancy procedures. 
Coding, for this author at least, was satisfactorily achieved intuitively during the data 
collection. Only on writing-up the cases was it though necessary to code the data in 
any way, and then only to be certain of conveying key elements within the cases 
(34). This may, however, have had something to do with the partly deductive 
approach adopted or the research problem. However, the usefulness of explicit 
coding during data collection appears limited. If the researcher is close to the data, 
analysis and theorising is inevitably taking place. The value of such procedures may 
have more to do with making qualitative research appear acceptable and rigorous, 
than improving the method. 
A further consideration is deciding how many cases to present, yet this may be out 
of the hands of the researcher. This author found that as each case progressed, as 
each interview was conducted, the data were found to be conforming to a pattern. 
In other words, a theory was emerging. The content of the data became ‘predictable’ 
because it conformed with expectations. This is common to qualitative research and 
is sometimes referred to as ‘saturation’ (by Glaser and Strauss, for example). When 
saturation is achieved, the researcher may claim to have a sufficient number of cases. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Case Study Method 
‘case studies of whatever form are a reliable and respectable procedure 
of social analysis... much criticism of their reliability and validity has 
been based on a misconception of the basis upon which the analyst 
may justifiably extrapolate from an individual case study to the social 
process in general... The validity of the extrapolation depends not on 
the typicality or representativeness of the case but upon the cogency 
of the theoretical reasoning’. 
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The use of the case study method can lead to charges of anecdotalism. Yet for many 
research topics within management this method is the most appropriate. However, 
case studies need not be viewed as solely exploratory or tentative exercises in 
research. Their validity, when correctly understood, depends, as Mitchell indicates 
above (39, on how they are used and the logic of their analysis. Yet it would be 
foolish to understate some of the weaknesses of the case study method. As the 
earlier discussion has indicated, qualitative approaches do bring the researcher closer 
to the phenomenon under investigation and some might say too close. This raises two 
distinct problems. Firstly, the problem of the dependence on the researcher’s skills 
of clinical analysis in maintaining objectivity. Yet as with quantitative research, 
judgement may still be passed on the validity of research results. (Indeed, the 
distinction between qualitative and quantitative research may be artificial in many 
ways. As earlier discussion suggests, one might agree with Ratcliffe that ‘all 
approaches to inquiry are inherently qualitative in nature’ (36).) Secondly, there is 
the political consideration of the acceptability of case study research. As Bonoma 
somewhat drily observes - and is perhaps a fitting conclusion to this paper - ‘because 
the major thrust of most published marketing research is towards deductive, 
numerate, and causally directed research, the researcher may have a greater challenge 
in demonstrating the benefits and neccessity of qualitative methods for the problem 
studied’ (37). 
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